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Optimal control theory is employed to characterize the socially optimal trajectory of the roy-
alty per channel and the number of royalty-paying users of state-owned spectrum for broad-
casting. The spectrum royalty is set by an omniscient public planner to maximize the sum of 
the discounted consumers’ utilities over an infinite planning horizon. The number of broad-
casters adjusts over time to profits, while the quality of the industry’s service is determined 
by variety and reception. The trade-off between the benefits of greater variety and the costs of 
intensified interferences associated with the number of broadcasters is central to the analysis. 
The convergence of the socially optimal trajectory of the royalty per channel and the number 
of broadcasters to a steady state and the comparative statics of the steady state are analyzed. 
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This paper is based on UOW Economics Working Paper 12-10. It provides an improved and 
more general analysis.  
                                                 





Consumers’ satisfaction from over-the-air (OTA) broadcasts typically increases with the 
broadcasts’ variety and the clarity of their reception. While an expansion of the number of 
OTA broadcasters increases the variety of programs, the increased spectral congestion inten-
sifies interferences thereby decreasing reception clarity. This variety-reception trade-off is the 
focal theme of our theory of optimal pricing of the broadcasting spectrum, and is motivated 
by the ensuing background description of OTA broadcasting industries in technologically ad-
vanced countries. 
 Due to the public good nature of OTA broadcasts and their educational, cultural and 
political impacts, and because of scarce bandwidth and high sunk costs, entry and content 
rules have long been tightly regulated in all major OECD countries (Steiner 1952; Webbink 
1973; Spence and Owen 1977). Until the late 1970s the television broadcasting industries in 
OECD countries comprised only a handful of licensed and highly protected public and com-
mercial firms. Since 1980 alternative transmission techniques, such as satellite and cable, 
have created a more favorable environment for entry into the television broadcasting indus-
try. Yet opportunities for entry have been mainly taken up at local levels and the market-
shares of nation-wide OTA television broadcasters have remained high (Motta and Polo, 
1997; Caves, 2006). 
 Radio broadcasting industries, on the other hand, have been less concentrated and 
more localized, but entry into these industries has also remained highly regulated due to sunk 
costs and a tight spectrum constraint. In many European metropolitan areas, for example, 
OTA radio broadcasts are provided by 20 to 80 FM stations and by similar numbers of AM 
stations. Metropolitan areas in Italy offer the largest FM variety. With only fifty kHz separa-
tion between stations, their FM broadcasting spectrum is the most congested in Europe. The 
European Conference of Postal and Telecommunications Administrations, a coordination 
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agency, recently re-emphasized the implications of this trade-off between content variety and 
reception clarity (CEPT, 2010).2  
 The adoption of digital transmission technologies, which are spectrally efficient, has 
expanded the scope for program variety in the television and radio broadcasting industries 
(Adda and Ottaviani, 2005). For example, the adoption of digital technology by American 
OTA broadcasters in 2007 and the subsequent turning off of analogue signals in 2008 have 
freed significant UHF spectrum. Even so, these spectral gains have not relaxed the spectrum 
constraint in the US television broadcasting industry, as the spectral dividend from the digital 
switchover was mainly auctioned off to large telecommunications carriers to accommodate 
the deployment of 4G mobile-phone networks3. Similar diversion of the digital switchover’s 
spectral dividend is expected in other OECD countries. The situation is more complex for ra-
dio broadcasting, as only a few countries have successfully adopted and rolled out digital 
platforms for radio transmissions, and even fewer have clear digital switchover plans for ana-
logue radio broadcasting.  
 In sum, buffer zones between broadcasters’ bands still have to be reduced if new en-
trants are to be accommodated. As a result, expansion of the OTA broadcasting industry can 
be expected to intensify the variety-reception trade-off in the pursuit of overall service quali-
ty. The variety-reception trade-off is thus likely to be most prominent under a deregulatory 
scheme that allows free entry and exit, both features we incorporate in our theoretical model. 
Spence (1976), Spence and Owen (1977), and Mankiw and Whinston (1986) have analyzed 
market failure arguments against free entry, based on the role of commercial broadcasters’ 
business models. The market price of quality programs (variety) under free entry may fail to 
induce supply if the value of programs to consumers exceed costs but advertising revenues do 
not. The public good argument may favor a regulatory approach by which public providers 
                                                 
2 "The available spectrum…constitutes a limited resource that is used intensively in Europe. In many countries the introduc-
tion of new FM services is difficult and may lead to an unacceptable degradation of existing services." (CEPT, 2010, Section 
1, P. 5). "The FM spectrum is in many areas overcrowded and may be reaching saturation if the high quality of reception and 
existing coverages must be retained. This results in FM services increasingly being interference-limited by design or other-
wise and these higher interference levels may have to be accepted to allow the introduction of many more additional ser-
vices" (ibid.  P. 5). 
3 Hazlett & Muñoz (2009) advocate increased competition in wireless markets and stress a tension between wel-
fare-maximizing frequency allocations and government rent-extraction policies. 
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are funded to supply program variety, although the relative value of regulation in this context 
is disputed by Borenstein (1988). 
 More recent theoretical contributions take a more positive view of free entry in broad-
casting. For instance, Berry and Waldfogel (1999) argue that free entry in the radio broad-
casting market is justified as long as consumption benefits compensate welfare (revenue) 
losses to incumbents stations. Cunningham and Alexander (2004) show that lower industry 
concentration produces direct (improved programming choice) and indirect (lower advertis-
ing prices) welfare gains. If advertising is also modeled as a bad (a nuisance inducing con-
sumers to switch channels), then free entry may have positive welfare effects depending on 
the substitutability of programs and the relative benefits of programs and advertising 
(Anderson and Coate 2005). 
 In view of recent trends in broadcasting spectrum deregulation (De Vany, 1998; Haz-
lett, 2008) and the variety-reception trade-off, our theoretical analysis examines the possibil-
ity of convergence of the number of broadcasters and the royalty per channel to a steady state 
and the comparative statics of the steady state when entry and exit are motivated by economic 
profit. We treat the broadcasting spectrum as a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural re-
source. As in the case of any state-owned natural resource, governments are entitled to royal-
ties on the use of spectrum. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits from the quality of 
the service provided by the broadcasting industry, there are indirect benefits, namely, the 
public goods and services financed by the states’ royalties on this natural resource. These in-
direct benefits and the aforesaid variety-reception trade-off form the centerpieces of our theo-
retical analysis. 
 We construct an optimal control model—a novel departure from the literature ex-
tant—in which the state’s time-varying royalties are chosen by an omniscient central planner 
so as to maximize the sum of the discounted direct and indirect benefits stemming from the 
use of the broadcasting spectrum. The model accounts for the fact that the number of broad-
casters adjusts to the profit from broadcasting at a rate moderated by sunk costs, where profit 
is assumed to rise with the quality of the industry’s service. Importantly, it also accounts for 
the variety-reception tradeoff, to wit, that on the one hand, entry increases variety, heightens 
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competition and, in turn, raises service quality, while on the other, entry increases spectral 
congestion and the intensified interferences lower service quality. 
 We show that a unique steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel 
exist, that the steady state is a local saddle point, and that the optimal solution converges to 
the steady state along the stable manifold. In contrast to the observed consolidation and return 
to concentration in the aftermath of deregulatory reforms in the United States, Italy, Germany 
and Japan (Noam, 1992; Motta and Polo, 1997; Hazlet, 2005), our analysis reveals that an op-
timally controlled royalty per channel will lead the OTA broadcasting industry to converge to 
a steady state with a larger number of broadcasters, higher quality, and a higher royalty. 
What’s more, our analysis of the basic control model shows that the steady state number of 
broadcasters is less than the number that maximizes the broadcasts’ quality at each point in 
time. Interestingly, this implies that quality rises with the number of broadcasters in a neigh-
borhood of the steady state. That is, in a neighborhood of the steady state, the program varie-
ty effect dominates the reception clarity effect when the number of broadcasters increases. 
 Our formal analysis of the OTA broadcasting industry begins by developing the dy-
namics of the number of broadcasters in section 2, and also includes the development of the 
variety-reception trade-off. Section 3 argues that the broadcasting industry has a multifaceted 
effect on consumers’ utility: a quality enhanced positive direct effect of the industry service, 
a negative indirect effect of the industry service by diverting income away from other goods, 
and a positive effect of the spectrum royalties paid by the industry on the provision of public 
goods and services. These considerations and the OTA broadcasting industry’s dynamics are 
then incorporated into the construction of the public planner’s optimal control problem. In 
section 4 the necessary and sufficient conditions are derived to set the stage for the qualitative 
analysis in the ensuing sections. 
 The unique steady-state solution of the control problem is derived in section 5 and 
shown to be a local saddle point. Section 6 presents the comparative statics of the steady-state 
number of OTA broadcasters, quality, and the royalty payment, and provides an economic in-
terpretation of them. Finally, section 7 contemplates an extension of the basic optimal control 
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model in which consumers’ aggregate income is dependent on the quality of the service pro-
vided by the broadcasting industry. 
 
2. Industry dynamics 
Let  denote the number of broadcasters of OTA transmitted programs (or broadcasts) at 
time . At every instant  each broadcaster uses a single channel and delivers a single pro-
gram. Let the broadcasters be technologically and location-wise identical, paying royalties 
 to the government for using a channel (or spectrum band) at time . Also let the width 
of each band be technologically determined and fixed, say , and let the bands be 
evenly spread along a fixed homogeneous spectrum space set aside for the broadcasting in-
dustry, namely . As a result, if the number of broadcasters increases, the bands shift 
and the buffer zones between them are evenly reduced. For tractability, let us further assume 
that the consumers of the OTA broadcasting industry’s service are located at an identical, 
physically unobstructed distance from the broadcasters, i.e., along a flat circle with the 
broadcasters at its centre. Accordingly, all broadcasts are equally receivable by all consum-
ers. We assume that the consumers of the broadcasting industry’s service are also users of 
broadcast time. That is, in addition to watching and/or listening to programs, they advertise 
their services during the programs. The consideration of consuming-using agents simplifies 
the analysis which, more generally, could have considered the demands of three types of 
agents: consumers only, users only and consumer-users. 
 Broadcasters enter the industry as long as profit per broadcaster  is positive, i.e., 
 , (1) 
where  is the time-invariant and parametric speed of adjustment, or ease of entry and 
exit, into the industry. Sunk costs, that is, the fixed costs associated with facilities, equipment 
and knowledge that are not transferable to other industries, deter entry and exit. Hence the 
larger the broadcasters’ sunk costs are, the lower the speed of adjustment of the number of 
broadcasters to profit per broadcaster.  
 From the perspective of the consumers, the quality of the aerially transmitted pro-
grams, say , rises with content variety and reception clarity. While the variety of pro-
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grams is increasing in the number of channels , interferences intensify as the number of 
channels increases because the buffer zones between the channels diminish. Given that the 
buffer zones are evenly reduced, reception clarity is positively related to the size of the un-
used spectrum , which by definition is given by 
 . (2) 
Consequently, the quality of the aerially transmitted broadcasts has two opposing effects re-
sulting from an increase in the number of broadcasters. There is a direct, or variety effect, of 
the number of channels on quality, which is positive but not increasing. On the other hand, 
there is an indirect, or interference effect, of the number of channels on quality by way of the 
reduced separation between channels, which is negative. Furthermore, up to a critical number 
of channels, say , the positive variety effect is assumed to dominate the negative 
interference effect. 
 Taking the above trade-off and assumptions into consideration, a functional form that 
captures the content variety and reception clarity effects on the quality of the service of the 
OTA broadcasting industry is , or using Eq. (2), 
 . (3) 
The logistic specification captures the opposing effects of the number of broadcasters on 
quality, because  as  and . Thus the 
marginal effect of the number of broadcasters on the quality of the service of the broadcasting 
industry is initially positive, but when more than half of the spectrum’s carrying capacity is 
used the negative interference effect dominates the positive variety effect on the quality of the 
industry’s service.  Note that  is nothing more than the number of broadcasters 
that maximizes quality at each . 
 Naturally, the demand for broadcasts increases with quality. Consequently, the broad-
casting industry’s total revenue  from advertisements and subscription fees (in the case 
of pay TV) is a function of quality as well. For tractability, we take this function to be linear. 
Letting the price of quality be unity (numéraire), it follows that , and upon using 
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Eq. (3), the industry’s total revenue may be expressed as a function of the number of broad-
casters, namely 
 . (4) 
Assuming that consumers do not have favorite channels, the industry’s total revenue is equal-
ly distributed. For simplicity, the instantaneous operational cost of each channel is taken to be 
time-invariant and positive, say , in which case the industry’s profit per broadcaster is 
given by . Substituting this expression for  in Eq. (1) and mak-
ing use of Eq. (4), it follows that the differential equation governing the change in the number 
of broadcasters over time is 
 . (5) 
Equation (5) shows that a once and for all increase in the royalty per channel by an industry 
initially in a steady state, i.e., when , reduces profit below zero and, subsequently, 
broadcasters leave the industry. In turn, the variety of programs is reduced but the reception 
of each broadcast is improved, all the while revenue per broadcaster decreases, causing more 
broadcasters to leave the industry until profit is driven back to zero. 
 
3. Consumers’ utility and public planner’s optimal control problem 
The consumers are taken to have an aggregate income of , of which  is spent on ac-
cess to, and advertisements in, OTA broadcasts. Consequently, the remainder, , is 
spent on private goods and services. The royalties paid by the broadcasters at time  are giv-
en by , and are immediately directed to finance public goods and services. 
 Consumers derive instantaneous utility from the quality of the service provided by the 
broadcasting industry , expenditures on private goods and services , and the 
investment of the spectrum’s royalties in the provision of public goods . Thus, the in-
stantaneous utility function  can be written as . In order to 
simplify the qualitative characterization of the ensuing optimal control problem, and to put 
the public goods nature of the royalty payments front and centre, it is henceforth assumed that 
the instantaneous utility function is of the quasi-linear form. That is, it is assumed that  is 
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linear in the consumers’ total spending on goods and services, , and strict-
ly increasing and strongly concave in the government’s investment of the spectrum’s royal-
ties in the provision of public goods and services, . Hence, 
 , (6) 
where , , and  on . Although the quality of the service provid-
ed by the broadcasting industry no longer appears in the instantaneous utility function, it is 
taken into account in the optimal control problem via the adjustment of the number of broad-
casters to profit per broadcaster. 
 In the proposed framework, the number of broadcasters is controlled through the state 
equation (5) by the royalty per channel, the latter of which is set by an omniscient central 
planner to maximize the consumers’ utility over an infinite horizon. The public planner’s de-
cision problem is 
   (7) 
 , , 
where  is the planner’s time-preference rate, , and 
 is the intertemporal indirect utility function. As  is exogenous, it does not influence 
the solution to problem (7), thus the objective functional in Eq. (7) may be replaced by 
 for the purpose of deriving an optimal control. 
 
4. Necessary and sufficient conditions for the optimal control of royalties 
Recalling that  denotes the fixed amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting industry, 
it is assumed that  for all . That is, we assume that there exist 
broadcasters of OTA transmitted programs and that they number less than the number that 
would use the entire spectrum available to the industry. A necessary and sufficient condition 
for the steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel to be positive is , as 
may be verified by inspection of Eqs. (16) and (17) below. Accordingly,  will be subse-
quently maintained. It will be shown in section 5 that the steady-state number of broadcasters 
is less than  without imposing any further assumptions on problem (7). As a result, the 
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state variable constraints  and  do not bind along an optimal solution in a 
neighborhood of the steady state and thus may be safely ignored for our purposes. 
 The current-value Hamiltonian associated with problem (7) is defined as 
   (8) 
where the costate variable l  is the planner’s current value shadow price of the number of 
broadcasters. By Theorems 14.3 and 14.9 of Caputo (2005), an interior solution to problem 
(7) must satisfy the following necessary conditions: 
 , (9) 
 , (10) 
 , , (11) 
 . (12) 
In order to derive a qualitative characterization of a solution to the decision problem postulat-
ed in Eq. (7), the necessary conditions in Eqs. (9)–(11) are reduced to a pair of ordinary dif-
ferential equations in . 
 To accomplish the reduction, first differentiate Eq. (9) with respect to . Then substi-
tute Eqs. (10) and (11) in the resulting differential equation, along with  
from Eq. (9), to arrive at 
 , , (13) 
 . (14) 
Equations (13) and (14) form the backbone of the analysis in the ensuing two sections. A so-
lution of problem (7) must satisfy them and the transversality condition given in Eq. (12). 
 Let  be a solution of the necessary conditions given in Eqs. (9)–(12), 
with corresponding current value costate variable . By Theorem 14.4 of Caputo 
(2005),  is a solution of problem (7) if  
for every admissible time path  and if  is concave in  for all 
 over an open convex set containing all admissible values of . 
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 Denote a steady state solution of the necessary conditions by , with 
corresponding current value costate variable . Then the transversality condition 
 holds with an equality if  exists and if 
 as . In order to see the veracity of this claim, note 
that (i)  as  implies that  as 
 by way of the fact that  from Eq. (9), (ii) , and (iii) 
the fact that the limit of a product of functions equals the product of their individual limits 
when each function possesses a limit. Moreover, if  as 
, then the necessary transversality condition given in Eq. (12) also holds, and for ba-
sically the same reasons as just indicated. 
 Let us now turn to the concavity requirement on the current value Hamiltonian 
. Because an interior solution and  have been assumed, it follows 
that  and . Hence, if the 
determinant of the Hessian matrix of  with respect to  is positive, then 
a solution  of the necessary conditions is the solution to the decision problem 
(7). As is readily verified, the aforesaid determinant is positive if and only if 
. Accordingly, the so-called Arrow-Pratt degree of relative risk aver-
sion in a stochastic framework being greater than one-half is equivalent to the determinant of 
the Hessian matrix of  with respect to  being positive. 
 Summing up, we have shown that if (i) a solution to the necessary conditions given in 
Eqs. (9)–(12) exists and converges to a steady state solution of the said necessary conditions, 
(ii) the Arrow-Pratt coefficient of relative risk aversion is greater than one-half, and (iii) the 
limit as the time horizon goes to infinity of the number of broadcasters exists, then there ex-
ists a unique optimal solution of the posed optimal control problem that converges to the 
steady state solution of the necessary conditions. Moreover, the unique optimal solution is 
fully characterized by Eqs. (13) and (14). 
 In the next section we show that (i) a unique steady state solution of the necessary 
conditions (13) and (14) exists, (ii) a closed-form expression for  can be de-
rived, and (iii) that  is a local saddle point. 
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5. The steady state and local stability 
The steady state values  are by definition the solution to Eqs. (13) and (14) 
when  and , and are therefore the solution to the system of linear equations 
 , (15) 
seeing as  and . Recalling that , the unique solution to this system is 
 , (16) 
 . (17) 
Note that even though we have not specified the functional form of , which is defined 
over the public goods and services, we have nonetheless been able to derive a unique closed-
form solution for the steady state values of the number of broadcasters and the royalty per 
channel. Furthermore, the implied unique steady state value of quality is by definition given 
by , or 
 , (18) 
upon using Eqs. (16) and (17). 
 At this juncture it is worthwhile to pause and examine two features of the steady state 
solution. First, observe that , a fact that may be established using a proof 
by contradiction. In other words, the consumers’ lifetime utility maximizing number of 
broadcasters in the steady state is less than the number that maximizes the quality of the 
broadcasting industry at each point in time. Second, using Eq. (3), it then follows that 
 in a neighborhood of the steady state. That is, the quality of the ser-
vices provided by the broadcasting industry is an increasing function of the number of broad-
casters in a neighborhood of the steady state. This means that in a neighborhood of the steady 
state, the program variety effect of the number of broadcasters dominates the reception clarity 
effect. 
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 As shown heretofore, the optimal solution of the control problem converges to the 
steady state in the limit of the planning horizon. It is thus logical to determine if the steady 
state can indeed be approached in the said limit, particularly from an industry with an initially 
small number of broadcasters. Once convergence to the steady state is proven to be possible, 
the effects of the model parameters on the steady-state solution can be investigated. 
 The local stability of the steady state solution  is determined by exam-
ining the Jacobian matrix of Eqs. (13) and (14) evaluated at , namely, 
  . (19) 
Using the fact that  from Eqs. (16) and (17), it is somewhat tedious 
but straightforward to show that . 
Hence, by Theorem 13.6 of Caputo (2005), the steady state is a local saddle point. The local 
phase-diagram in the -plane surrounding the steady state can now be constructed. 
 By definition, and using Eq. (13), the  isocline is given by those values of  and 
 that satisfy the linear equation . As a result, the  isocline is a down-
ward sloping straight line in the -phase plane with vertical intercept  and hor-
izontal intercept . 
 By the implicit function theorem, the slope of the  isocline in a neighborhood of 
the steady state is 
 , (20) 
which may be positive or negative in general. However, it is readily shown from Eq. (19) and 
the fact that , that 
 . (21) 
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That is to say, the slope of the  isocline in a neighborhood of the steady state is greater 
than the slope of the  isocline in a neighborhood of the steady state. 
 The upshot of the two preceding paragraphs is that the local phase diagram can take 
either of two configurations, as depicted in Figures 1 and 2 below. Note that the vector field 




 As seen in Figure 1, the only trajectories that converge to the steady state in the limit 
of the planning horizon are the pair corresponding to the stable manifold, indicated by the 
thicker pair of lines. Given that the aforementioned sufficient conditions hold, the stable man-
ifold represents the unique solution to problem (7) once an initial condition is specified, as 
the values of the number of broadcasters and royalty per channel along it satisfy all the neces-
sary conditions. It therefore follows that the optimal time-path of the number of broadcasters 
and the royalty per channel are either both monotonically increasing, or monotonically de-
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creasing, functions of time. In view of the fact that the optimal time-path of quality is given 
by , it follows that . Hence, 
because , quality is either a monotonically increasing or monotonically 
decreasing function of time and mimics the qualitative behavior over time of the number of 
broadcasters in a neighborhood of the steady state. 
 For example, starting from a highly regulated industry with a relatively small number 
of broadcasters, say , the left upward sloped arm of the stable manifold is the one 
that is relevant for the public planner. Along this trajectory the number of broadcasters and 
quality increase over time despite the fact that the royalty per channel is increasing over time 
as well. The economic explanation for this seemingly anomalous result is that given the rela-
tively small number of initial broadcasters and quality, the initial and subsequent royalties are 
relatively low, thereby allowing broadcasters to earn a positive profit. The resulting profit in-
duces entry by other broadcasters and thus raises quality. The optimal royalty per channel set 
by the public planner in this case permits the broadcasting industry to approach the steady 
state along this trajectory by setting a relatively low initial royalty, followed by an ever in-
creasing royalty. 
 The situation is rather different in Figure 2, which also depicts a local saddle point for 
the steady state. The optimal time-paths of the number of broadcasters, quality, and the royal-
ty per channel are monotonic functions of time, as in Figure 1, but in this case the first two 
variables move in the opposite direction of the third over time, as the stable manifold is now 
downward sloping. As before, consider a highly regulated industry with a relatively small 
number of broadcasters so that , so that the left downward sloped arm of the stable 
manifold is the one that is relevant for the public planner. Here, the more natural case results: 
namely, the optimal policy has the royalty falling over time and the number of broadcasters 
and quality increasing over time. The economic explanation for this result is that in contrast 
to the prior case, the small number of initial broadcasters and quality is accompanied by a 
relatively high initial royalty. In which case, the planner must facilitate the broadcasters’ ex-
traction of profits by lowering the royalty over time in order to attract additional broadcasters 





6. Comparative statics of the steady state 
The effects of the model parameters on the steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty 
per channel are obtained by differentiation of Eqs. (16) and (17). The steady state compara-
tive statics for quality follow from differentiation of Eq. (18). Note, however, that because 
, the steady state comparative statics for quality have the same sign as 
those for the number of broadcasters and thus need not be computed. 
 Consider first the effect of an increase in the cost of operating a channel on the 
steady-state number of broadcasters and royalty per channel, namely, 
 , . (22) 
Thus as costs increase, the planner attempts to help the broadcasters by lowering the royalty. 
Even so, profit declines and some broadcasters leave the industry, resulting in fewer broad-
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casters in the new steady state along with lower quality. Moreover, royalty revenue 
 declines and the consumers are worse off, for by Theorem 14.10 of Caputo 
(2005), 
 , (23) 
and  from Eq. (9). 
 The effect of an increase in the planner’s rate of time preference on the steady-state 
number of broadcasters and royalty per broadcaster is given by 
 , , (24) 
seeing as . Therefore as the planner becomes more impatient, the steady state royalty 
payment increases while the steady state number of broadcasters and quality decrease. 
 The effect of the speed of entry and exit to profit per broadcaster on the steady-state 
number of broadcasters and royalty per broadcaster is 
 , . (25) 
Hence, as broadcasters become more responsive to changes in profit per broadcaster, the 
planner lowers the steady state royalty per channel. This has the effect of increasing profit per 
broadcaster, which in turn draws more broadcasters into the industry and raises quality. 
Whether consumers are better or worse off is not clear, however, as 
 . (26) 
If , then it follows from Figures 1 and 2 that  and  for all 
. Therefore, in this case, consumers are indeed better off as broadcasters become 
more responsive to changes in profit per broadcaster. 
 Widening the channels’ spectral bands (i.e., increasing ) decreases the steady-state 
number of broadcasters (and thus channels) as well as the steady-state royalty per channel, as 
 , . (27) 
Moreover, royalty revenue  falls and consumers are worse off because 
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 . (28) 
Therefore, widening the channels’ spectral bands is qualitatively equivalent to an increase in 
the operating costs per channel. 
 For the final steady state comparative statics calculation, we examine the effect of an 
increase in the amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting industry, that is, 
 , . (29) 
In comparing Eq. (22) to Eq. (29), it is seen that the effect of an increase in operating costs 
per channel on the steady state number of broadcasters, quality, and the royalty per channel, 
is identical to that of a decrease in the amount of spectrum available to the broadcasting in-
dustry.  Moreover, 
 . (30) 
so that consumers are better off if more spectrum is allocated to the broadcasting industry. 
 
7. Extension: consumers’ income sensitivity to broadcasts’ quality 
As the total effect of the quality of the broadcasting industry service on the consumers’ ag-
gregate income is not clear, the previous sections ignored the issue. Doing so helped sharpen 
the focus on the implications of the tradeoff between variety and reception for the allocation 
of spectrum for broadcasting. In extending the analysis to this issue, we consider the possibil-
ity that the quality of the broadcasting industry service has two opposing effects on aggregate 
income, implying that the sign of  is not clear a-priori. On the one hand, 
broadcasts disseminate information that enhances knowledge, forms standards of perfor-
mance and generates transactions. On the other, broadcasts divert consumers’ time from work 
and active investment in human and social capitals. These opposing effects are intensified by 
the quality of the broadcasts. With  indicating the information dissemination effect 
of broadcasts,  the production-effort diversion effect, and  the aggregate in-
come attainable when the said effects offset one another, the consumers’ aggregate income 
may be expressed as , where . 
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 Because we incorporate the sensitivity of the consumers’ aggregate income to broad-
casts’ quality into the analysis, consumers’ aggregate income appears as a determinant of the 
consumers’ income directed to the consumption of private goods. We therefore relax the as-
sumption that the marginal utilities from spending on the quality of the broadcasting indus-
try’s service and on private goods are identical, and instead denote them by  and 
, respectively. Consequently, and in consideration of Eq. (3), the consumers’ instan-
taneous utility function  is now of the form 
  (31) 
Equation (31) replaces Eq. (6) when the effects of the quality of the broadcasting industry’s 
service on the consumers’ aggregate income are contemplated, as in the present case. 
 Our interest in what follows is in deducing the effects of the preceding extension on 
the local dynamics and steady state comparative statics of optimal control problem (7). The 
exposition will be greatly simplified by relying on some basic results from Caputo (1997, 
2005 Chapter 18) pertaining to the class of exponentially discounted, autonomous, infinite 
horizon optimal control problems with one state variable and one control variable, of which 
problem (7) is a special case. Note that assumptions (A.1)–(A.7) from Caputo (1997, 2005 
Chapter 18) hold in the present case. 
 As was the case when the effects of quality on aggregate income were ignored, the 
steady state is a local saddle point by Theorem 18.1 of Caputo (2005). Moreover, in a neigh-
bourhood of the steady state, the phase diagram is qualitatively identical to Figure 1.  As a re-
sult, the economic interpretation of the local dynamics that applied in the basic model applies 
to the extended model and thus need not be repeated. What differs from the basic model is 
that the steady state number of broadcasters may be greater than or less than the number that 
maximizes quality at each point in time, i.e., .  That is, it is not necessarily 
the case that in the extended model, steady state quality rises with the number of broadcast-
ers, in contrast to the basic model. In what follows, we focus on the steady state comparative 
statics of the parameters specific to the extended version of the model, to wit . 
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 By Corollary 18.2.1 of Caputo (2005), the effect of the consumers’ aggregate income 
sensitivity to the quality of broadcasters on the steady-state number of broadcasters and roy-
alty per channel is given by 
 , . (32) 
Thus an increase in the effect of the broadcasting industry’s service quality on aggregate in-
come increases the number of broadcasters and decreases the royalty per channel in the new 
steady state if the old steady state number of broadcasters is less than the number that maxim-
izes quality at each point in time.  In this case the positive variety effect on the quality of the 
industry’s service dominates the negative congestion effect.  Regardless of which effect dom-
inates, however, consumers are better off, as Theorem 14.10 of Caputo (2005) implies that 
 , (33) 
seeing as . 
 An increase in the consumers’ direct instantaneous marginal utility from the quality of 
broadcasts increases the number of broadcasters and decreases the royalty per channel in the 
new steady state if in the old steady state the variety effect on the quality of the industry’s 
service dominated the congestion effect, seeing as 
 ,  (34) 
by Corollary 18.2.1 of Caputo (2005).  Consumers are unambiguously better off no matter 
what signs prevail for the steady state comparative statics, because 
 . (35) 
 Finally, the effect of an increase in the consumers’ instantaneous marginal utility from 
the private goods is given by 
  , . (36) 
Hence, if in the old steady state the variety effect dominated the congestion effect and the dif-
ference between the information-dissemination effect and effort-diversion effect of the 
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broadcasts’ quality on the consumers’ income is larger than the quality price of broadcasts, 
then an increase in the instantaneous marginal utility of consumption of private goods in-
creases the number of broadcasters and decreases the royalty per channel in the new steady 
state. Because 
 , (37) 
consumers are unambiguously better off, as in the two previous cases. 
 
8. Conclusion 
Spectrum is a state-owned, time-invariant, scarce natural resource. The advent of digital 
transmission technologies has done little to relieve broadcasting spectrum constraints. The 
perennial trade-off between content variety and reception clarity continues to prevail and is 
likely to be most prominent under a deregulatory scheme. As in the case of any state-owned 
natural resource, governments are entitled to charge royalties on its use and can direct these 
revenues to finance public goods and services. Therefore, in addition to the direct benefits 
from the service provided by the broadcasting industry, additional benefits accrue to consum-
ers from the public goods and services financed by the royalties on this natural resource. 
 In order to set spectrum royalties efficiently, we developed two optimal control mod-
els that take into account the variety-reception trade-off and the entry and exit of broadcasters 
in accordance with the profit per broadcaster. With the aid of phase-plane analysis, we were 
able to achieve a qualitative characterization of the consumers’ lifetime utility maximizing 
time-path of the royalty per channel and the number of broadcasters, including their steady 
state comparative statics. In the basic model we showed that the steady state number of 
broadcasters is less than the number that maximizes quality at each point in time, implying 
that in a neighborhood of the steady state, quality rises with the number of broadcasters. In-
terestingly, and in contrast to the observed consolidation and return to concentration in the af-
termath of past deregulatory reforms in OECD countries, our analysis reveals that the optimal 
control of the broadcasting industry may gradually lead the industry to a steady state with a 
larger number of broadcasters, higher quality, and higher royalties. 
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